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Steckman and Rader: Adverse Domination

ADVERSE DOMINATION, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND THE
IN PARI DELICTO DEFENSE – APPLICATION IN CASES INVOLVING
CLAIMS OF ACCOUNTING MALPRACTICE AND CORPORATE FRAUD
Laurence A. Steckman, Esq.*
Adam J. Rader, Esq.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP,1 a receiver, Robert W. Seiden
(“Seiden” or “the Receiver”) sought to avoid a statute of limitations
* Laurence Steckman is a principal attorney with Offit Kurman, PA and has been
litigating securities and complex commercial cases for more than thirty years. In
July 2006, Super Lawyers Magazine identified Mr. Steckman as one of New York's
first “Super Lawyers” in both securities and business litigation, an honor he has
received nine times since then. He has authored or been principal co-author of more
than fifty published works on the law, and book chapters and a co-authored volume
on philosophy and existential psychology. Mr. Steckman pursued doctoral studies
in philosophy at Columbia University prior to attending law school after he received
undergraduate degrees summa cum laude in classic guitar and philosophy. He
graduated Touro Law School in 1988, with honors, and was a member of the law
review, publishing on federal securities litigation. He began his law career as a
litigator in the New York office Shea & Gould.
** Adam J. Rader is a principal attorney with the law firm Offit Kurman, PA and has
been litigating and arbitrating complex commercial domestic and international
business cases in state courts, federal courts, and arbitral fora for more than twentyfive years. He handles a wide range of civil cases, including matters ranging from
international trade and extradition to trademark and Native American law. He has
handled high profile matters ranging from representation of a prominent German real
estate developer in extradition proceedings to representing an Azerbaijani law
professor accused of attempting to sell artwork allegedly stolen during World War
II. He recently defended a high-profile Russian oligarch fighting extradition to the
U.S. to respond to allegations of Foreign Corrupt Practices and RICO violations in
connection with India investments. Mr. Rader is a graduate of University of
Wisconsin Madison Law School.
1
No. 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 6137618 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), aff’d,
796 F. App’x 381 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc denied, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
4005 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020).
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dismissal of his claims against several auditor firms which had
provided services to a Chinese technology company, China Valves
Technology, Inc. (“CVTI” or “CVVT”).2 The events giving rise to the
claims occurred many years before the Receiver’s appointment and
would, on their face, appear to have long been time-barred as a receiver
takes any claim subject to defenses that could be asserted against the
party in whose shoes he or she stands. 3 However, the Receiver argued
his claims should be deemed timely pursuant to the “adverse
domination doctrine,” (the “Doctrine”), 4 under which the limitation
period may be equitably tolled subject to proof that a company’s
defrauding officers/directors were “dominating/controlling” company
business.5
Id. at *6. CVTI had been capitalized via a reverse merger. A “reverse merger” is
the acquisition of a private company by an existing public company. The transaction
is often undertaken so the private company can bypass the lengthy, complex and
expensive process of going public through a traditional public offering. See
https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-reverse-mergers-and-how-do-you-spot-one4165740.
3
See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473 (1893).
4
The literature on the adverse domination doctrine is considerable. See, e.g.,
Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in
Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275 (2012);
Michael G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search
for Middle Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 695
(1997); Michael E. Baughman, Comment, Defining the Boundaries of the Adverse
Domination Doctrine: Is there any Repose for Corporate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1065 (1995); The Maryland Survey: 1993-1994, Recent Decisions The
Maryland Court of Appeals, 54 MD. L. REV. 670 (1995); Christopher R. Leslie, Den
of Inequity: The Case for Equitable Doctrines in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 81 CALI. L. REV.
1587 (1993); Ashley Rosen, The Maryland Survey: 2001-2002: Recent Decisions
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 62 MD. L. REV. 700 (2003); John R. Leonard,
Case Comment, Corporate Law––Massachusetts Limits Tolling of Statute of
Limitations for Breach of Fiduciary Duties in Closely Held Corporations—Aiello v.
Aiello, 852 N.E.2d 68 (Mass. 2006), 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 295 (2007); Robert W.
Thompson et al., The Limits of Derivative Actions: The Application of Limitation
Periods to Derivative Actions, 49 ALBERTA L. REV. 603 (2012); Duane Rudolph,
Workers, Dignity, and Equitable Tolling, 15 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 126 (2017); Emil
Bukhman, Time Limits on Arbitrability of Securities Industry Disputes Under the
Arbitration Rules of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 143
(1995); Matthew G. Dore, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional
Malpractice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 127 (1995).
5
Complaint, Case & Demand for Trial by Jury at 6, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No.
18-cv-00588 CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter
Receiver’s Complaint].
2
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The Receiver further argued that even if he was wrong about
the limitation/accrual, he should survive a limitation-based dismissal
motion, anyway. Had the shareholders brought a timely derivative
action against the auditors, a motion to dismiss their claims would have
been granted because, he argued, a derivative action brought by
shareholders standing in the shoes of the same corporation that injured
the shareholders would have been vulnerable to an in pari delicto
defense based on the corporation’s fraudulent conduct and unclean
hands.6 This would have resulted, he argued, in such derivative action
necessarily failing, had it been brought, requiring, as a matter of law,
that the shareholders be deemed to have lacked the “motivation” to file
a futile suit.7 The Receiver concluded that Doctrine-based tolling
occurs unless someone “motivated” to sue gains factual knowledge
sufficient to timely interpose claims seeking redress. Therefore, he
urged, the shareholders must be deemed to have lacked “motivation”
as they must be deemed to have known any claims they might file
would be dismissed on grounds of in pari delicto. According to the
Receiver, the combination of the adverse domination doctrine and the
in pari delicto doctrine had to be construed to render all his claims
timely.8
Part II describes the facts underlying the Receiver’s case,
arguments made regarding the interpretation of the Doctrine and a
hypothetical auditor-raised in pari delicto defense, and the trial court’s
reasoning, resulting in a with-prejudice dismissal of the first-time-on
pleading. Part III describes the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’
reasoning in affirming the trial court’s analysis and decision, clarifying
the adverse domination theory and the proper application of the in pari
delicto doctrine. Part IV examines application of the in pari delicto
6

Applicability of the in pari delicto doctrine as a defense in shareholder derivative
actions has been the subject of several scholarly articles. See, e.g., Shepard, supra
note 4; Henry duPont Ridgely, Avoiding the Thickets of Guesswork: The Delaware
Supreme Court and Certified Questions of Corporation Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 1127
(2010); Maaren A. Choksi, Interpreting In Pari Delicto in the Wake of Kirschner v.
KPMG LLP, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44 (2010); Sandra S. O'Loughlin & Christopher
J. Bonner, 2013-2014 Survey of New York Law: Business Associations, 65 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 641 (2015); Lee C. Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debt, 56 DUKE
L. J. 1201, 1258-59 (2007); Richard P. Swanson, Accountants' Liability, Theories of
Liability, SN073 ALI-ABA 23 (ALI 2008).
7
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 10, Seiden v. Frazer
Frost, LLP, No. 18-cv-00588 CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2018), ECF No. 25.
8
Id.
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doctrine in the context of shareholder derivative actions, generally,
where the adverse domination doctrine is at issue. This section focuses
on a leading case from the New York Court of Appeals, Kirschner v.
KPMG LLP,9 in which an outside auditor asserted an in pari delicto
defense in a shareholder derivative action, discussing how the Seiden
litigation would have turned out if the rules in Kirschner had been
applied.10 Part V discusses application of in pari delicto arguments
not only in derivative actions, but actions filed by Bankruptcy Trustees
or others who step into the shoes of adversely dominated corporations.
Equitable considerations, the authors conclude, should figure
prominently in evaluating potential applicability of limitation period
tolling where adverse domination claims are interposed and in pari
delicto arguments proffered in derivative litigation.
II.

THE FACTS, CLAIMS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT
A.

The Receiver’s Allegations of Auditor Misconduct

Plaintiff Robert W. Seiden, Esq., the receiver for CVTI filed
claims against several auditor firms (“Defendants” or the “Auditors”) 11
for aiding and abetting and/or negligently allowing the alleged
common law misconducts of the officers and directors of CVTI, a
China technology company that became a public entity, via a reverse
merger. The Receiver alleged that between 2008 and 2011,
Defendants assisted CVTI in raising $64.7 million by repeatedly
signing off on fraudulent documents.12 The Auditors were retained
from January 2008 through September 2012 to audit CVTI financial
statements, review SEC filings, and complete tax work. 13 The
Receiver alleged the Auditors failed to fulfill their engagement letter
obligations to CVTI from January 2008-December 2012,14 by failing,
inter alia, to properly report what the Receiver characterized as
“obvious” related-party transactions, under PCAOB and GAAP

9

938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 945.
11
The defendant firms were Frazer Frost, LLP; Moore, Stephens, Wurth, Frazer &
Terbet, LLP; Frazer, LLP; and Frost, PLLC.
12
Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 6.
13
Id. at 7.
14
Id. at 8.
10
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standards.15 Neither details of the referenced misconduct nor existence
of same was at issue in the dismissal motion practice that followed
complaint filing.
The Defendants were Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (“PCAOB”) registered audit firms with their principal places of
business in Brea, California, except one auditor who had a principal
place of business in Little Rock, Arkansas, but performed audit-related
work for CVTI in Orange County, California. 16 The Receiver alleged
five causes against the Auditors: negligence and gross negligence;
breach of contract; aiding, abetting, or participation in breaches of
fiduciary duty; aiding, abetting, or participation in a fraudulent
scheme; and unjust enrichment arising out of Defendants’ audit work
between 2008 and 2012, which claims he pleaded were currently
actionable.17
On September 12, 2016, Seiden was appointed as Receiver of
Id. “PCAOB” is the common abbreviation for the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board which is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation created by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee accounting professionals who provide
independent audit reports for publicly traded companies. “GAAP” is the common
abbreviation for generally accepted accounting principles.
16
Id. at 3.
17
Among other things, the Receiver alleged the Auditors reviewed CVTI’s third
quarter 2010 financial statements in connection with CVTI’s Form 10-Q. Before the
third quarter 2010 Form 10-Q was filed, CVYI’s CEO Fang allegedly informed
Defendants about misrepresentations made by him in connection with an acquisition
involving Changsha Valves including misrepresentations regarding: (i) the seller’s
identity; (ii) the related parties’ role in acquisition; (iii) the acquisition price; (iv) the
acquisition structure; and (v) the allocation of assets and liabilities. Id. at 14.
Notwithstanding alleged receipt of the above information, according to the Receiver,
the Defendants confirmed the misinformation in the first and second quarter of 2010
but failed to take appropriate steps to communicate this to CVTI’s management or
audit committee. Accordingly, the Receiver maintained that the third quarter 2010
Form 10-Q was filed with known misstatements. Id. Despite the Auditor’s alleged
awareness there should be “heightened skepticism” for the 2011 audit, they did not,
he alleged, take appropriate steps which would have detected CVTI’s failure to make
the $1.7 million VAT payment in connection with Hanwei Valve, which CVTI had
recorded in its books. That failure allegedly resulted in an audit report with an
unqualified opinion for financial statements that overstated net income 6.22% and
understated tax liability. Id. The Receiver further complained Defendants failed to
comply with “other contractual obligations” by performing independent testing to
make sure no material misstatements were made. Id. at 14-15. He also complained
that the Auditors CVTI’s 2010 Form 10-K inaccurately stated the audit was
conducted in accord with PCAOB standards and that CVTI’s financial statements
fairly presented the Company’s position and results in conformity with U.S. GAAP.
15
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CVTI by the District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Clark, in the action captioned Michael Markbreiter, et al. v. China
Valves Technology, Inc., et al.18 On February 2, 2017, the Nevada
Court entered a Final Order and Judgment against CVTI, which also
set forth the general powers of Plaintiff, as the Receiver which
included the “[a]uthority to commence, continue, join in, and/or
control any action, suit or proceeding, of any kind or nature, in the
name of CVVT . . . .”19
Seiden’s complaint alleged that the limitation period was
tolled as of the date he was appointed, 20 and that “[t]he Receiver did
not discover and could not have discovered with the exercise of
reasonable diligence have discovered Defendants’ participation in the
CVVT’s activities and the true nature of Defendants’ . . . injury
suffered before his appointment” and that “Defendants’ wrongful acts
. . . were inherently undiscoverable . . . until after the appointment of
the Receiver and there is no basis by which knowledge can be imputed
to the Receiver that pre-dates the appointment.”21 Nineteen months
after his appointment, on April 9, 2018, Seiden filed his complaint
pleading he “did not discover and could not have discovered with the
exercise of reasonable diligence . . . Defendants’ participation in
CVVT’s activities and the true nature of Defendants’ wrongful
actions and the injury suffered before his appointment in September
2016.”22 He alleged “the domination of CVVT by the executives who
committed the bad acts with Defendants made the discovery of the
bad acts by the Receiver impossible until sometime after the
appointment of the Receiver and the removal of the bad actors,” 23 in

18

Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL
6137618, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018).
19
Id. In certain legal documents, China Valves is referred to as CVVT, rather than
CVTI––the abbreviation CVVT is used herein in some instances to be consistent
with quoted language. Accordingly, CVTI and CVVT are used interchangeably
throughout this article with both abbreviations referring to China Valves
Technology, Inc.
20
Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 3.
21
Id. at 6.
22
Id.
23
Id. Although poorly pleaded, the Receiver may have meant to allege (or should
have alleged) that CVTI’s shareholders could not have discovered the wrongdoing
prior to the Receiver’s appointment. CVTI’s shareholders’ potential discovery––
despite the adverse domination––was certainly the issue upon which the court
focused in evaluating the motion to dismiss the complaint.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/8

6

Steckman and Rader: Adverse Domination

2021

ADVERSE DOMINATION

703

other words, he affirmatively pleaded his complaint was timely and
that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the Doctrine.

B.

The Receiver’s Adverse Domination Tolling
Theory

Because CVTI was allegedly under the control and domination
of its wrongdoing directors, Seiden urged that the limitation period was
required to be tolled until some point after the Receiver’s appointment.
That point was not identified in the complaint but, presumably, it
would have been the time the bad acts alleged could have been
discovered so the Receiver could seek relief. 24 All applicable
limitation periods were tolled, he argued, notwithstanding the
relatively short California limitations periods applicable to his
common law claims.25
Under California’s discovery rule, limitations periods begin to
run once the plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances that
would put a reasonable person on notice of wrongdoing and that the
claims the Receiver alleged accrued “when the plaintiff . . . discovered
all facts essential to his cause of action . . . when plaintiff either (1)
actually discovered his injury and its negligent cause or (2) could have
discovered injury and cause through the exercise of reasonable
24

Id.
California law was applicable because the subject agreements between CVTI and
the Auditors all contained California choice of law provisions. Plaintiff’s
negligence and gross negligence claims were governed by a two-year limitation
period under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 339(1) (West 2020). His breach of contract
and breach of fiduciary duty claims had four-year limitation periods under CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 337, 343 (West 2019). His fraud and unjust enrichment
claims were governed by three-year limitation periods under CAL CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 338 (West 2019). As Judge Carney would hold, citing City of Vista v. Robert
Thomas Sec., Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), “where [the]
gravamen of [the] complaint is fraud, claims are subject to a three-year statute of
limitations.” Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018
WL 6137618, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018). The Receiver did not contest these
statutes of limitations applied to his claims nor the fact that at least six years had
passed before he commenced his action. Rather, the Receiver asserted that the
applicable limitation periods were tolled under the adverse domination doctrine and
did not begin to run until the Receiver’s appointment in September 2016, which
effectively removed the adversely dominating directors. See Seiden v. Frazer Frost,
LLP, 796 F. App'x 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2020).
25
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diligence.”26 The Auditors submitted multiple court documents
showing the facts underlying the Receiver’s claims were not only
available to shareholders before he was even appointed, but that they
had already pleaded and litigated them in a securities class action
litigation.27 The same facts the Receiver claimed were impossible to
discover had been litigated, starting in 2011, seven years before he
filed his complaint.28 The defense argued the limitations period had
long ago expired, based on shareholder knowledge of the pertinent
facts which were set forth in a publicly filed securities class case which
had in fact been dismissed. 29
Seiden was appointed as a receiver in an action against CVTI
insiders on or about September 12, 2016.30 His Complaint was filed
April 9, 2018—more than eighteen months later.
The question before Judge Carney, the trial judge, had to do
with proper interpretation of the Doctrine upon which the Receiver was
relying—Judge Carney stated the issue as follows:
“The doctrine of adverse domination allows ‘tolling for
claims alleging wrongdoing by those who control the
corporation.’” In re Verit Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 61, at
*2 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Jackson, 133 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1998)). The
doctrine also applies to toll the statute of limitations in
actions against third-parties. See Admiralty Fund v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 379, 390 (Ct. App.
1983) (applying adverse domination doctrine in action
against third-party insurance company where the
plaintiff corporation asserted it was prevented from
discovering its loss until its own “wrongdoer
employees” were removed). “The doctrine carries the
same requirement of notice before accrual is deemed to
26

April Enters. Inc. v. KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
27
Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Exs. A-E to Declaration of
Lawrence A. Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC
(KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. Nos. 2-6.
28
Id.
29
See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 9-20, Seiden v. Frazer
Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No.
23.
30
Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 3. See also Seiden, 2018 WL 6137618 at
*3.
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have occurred. As with the discovery rule, the test is
whether plaintiff knows or should know of the claim.”
Hecht v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 333 Md. 324, 352
(1994). “When a plaintiff relies on a theory of
fraudulent concealment, delayed accrual, equitable
tolling, or estoppel to save a cause of action that
otherwise appears on its face to be time-barred, he or
she must specifically plead facts which, if proved,
would support the theory.” Mills v. Forestex Co., 108
Cal. App. 4th 625, 641 (2003).31
Citing Allen v. Ramsay,32 the court explained:
A receiver occupies no better position than that which
was occupied by the person or party for whom he acts
and the receiver takes the property and the rights of one
for whom he was appointed in the same condition and
subject to the same equities as existed before his
appointment and any defense good against the original
party is good against the receiver. 33
The judge in Allen further explained:
The showing of excuse for late filing must be made in
the complaint. Formal averments or general
conclusions to the effect that the facts were not
discovered until a stated date, and that the plaintiff
could not reasonably have made an earlier discovery,
are useless. The complaint must set forth specifically
(1) the facts of the time and manner of discovery; and
(2) the circumstances which excuse the failure to have
made an earlier discovery.34
The Receiver argued the reason the limitation period was
tolled, as to him, was because CVTI management was engaged in
fraud and would not sue itself (or the Auditors who supposedly
enabled their fraud)—therefore, until the corruption ended, the
Doctrine required the limitation periods be tolled, as to him. 35 Judge
31

Seiden, 2018 WL 6137618 at *5.
4 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Cal. Ct. App 1960).
33
Id. at 583 (citations omitted).
34
Id. at 581 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
35
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 6.
32
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Carney, however, explained that to obtain Doctrine-based tolling,
plaintiff must not only show that the wrongdoing directors/officers
controlled the company, but he must also negate the possibility that
an informed stockholder or director could have induced the
corporation to sue for relief, 36 by showing management’s control was
so extensive as to preclude discovery. 37 The assumption underlying
the Doctrine is that “with control comes non-disclosure and without
knowledge of directors’ wrongful activities plaintiffs have no
meaningful opportunity to bring suit.”38
The Defense submitted a table containing a side-by-side
juxtaposition of relevant paragraphs of the Receiver’s complaint,
against two previously dismissed federal class complaints (a pleading
and repleading, after dismissal), as well as a previously filed SEC
complaint against the CVTI insiders, and another SEC complaint filed
against the Auditors.39 All the pleadings were publicly available. All
the facts were known to the public, at least as of January 11, 2011,
through the “Citron Report,” in a published article attached to the
Complaint.40
These same facts formed the basis of a shareholder derivative
action against CVTI, filed on September 14, 2011.41 This derivative
36

Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984).
See Admiralty Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759-60 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (“[T]he dishonest president and other high ranking officers controlled the
[company’s] operations to such an extent as to preclude discovery, the tolling of a
discovery of loss provision should be considered,” otherwise, the shareholders would
receive no protection during the time the wrongdoers controlled the company.);
Smith v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“A statute of
limitations tolls when a claim arises from a director’s or employee’s defalcation and
the wrongdoers’ control makes discovery impossible.”) (emphasis added).
Shareholder discovery of the facts of a fraud defeats adverse domination—tolling
sometimes occurs but only where domination prevents discovery of wrongdoing. Id.
(citing San Leandro Canning Co. Inc. v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026, 1028 (Cal. 1931)).
38
Hecht v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 402 (Md. 1994).
39
Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Ex. A to Declaration of
Lawrence A. Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC
(KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. No. 2.
40
See also In re China Valves Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 11 Civ. 0796, 2012 WL
4039852, at *3 & n.21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012) (discussing the Citron Report).
41
The shareholder derivative action was stayed pending a decision on the motion to
dismiss the Class Action claim against CVTI and was ultimately voluntarily
dismissed. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Exs. J-K to
Declaration of Lawrence A. Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 1800588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. Nos. 11-12.
37
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action, which did not plead any claims against any Auditor Defendant,
was discontinued without prejudice and never re-filed.42 The trial
court concluded, with respect to discovery:
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has properly
alleged the domination of CVVT by the directors who
committed the alleged bad acts with Defendants. While
tolling may be appropriate in situations where there is
such domination and control as to preclude nonwrongdoing employees or shareholders from
“discovery,” it is not warranted under the facts of this
case. Plaintiff has not alleged, nor could he, that the
directors’ domination and control of CVVT precluded
discovery of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing. Here, it
is not controverted that there were several actions
brought against CVVT and Defendants prior to
Plaintiff’s appointment as Receiver for CVVT. These
actions set forth factual allegations that give rise to
Plaintiff’s causes of actions, and clearly put the public
on notice of CVVT and Defendants’ wrongdoing. 43
To properly allege entitlement to Doctrine-based equitable
tolling, plaintiff must establish such “domination” that interested
parties must have been precluded from discovering the wrongdoing,
disabling a motivated person from suing. 44 Restated, plaintiff must
“negate the possibility” that an informed stockholder or director could
have known enough to sue for relief, within the limitation period. 45
Uncontradicted motion evidence showed the shareholders did discover
the insiders’ wrongdoing and sued on the same facts the Receiver
claimed were non-discoverable. The same gravamen of fact was
repeated in class and derivative suits and two SEC complaints, prior
even to the Receiver’s appointment. 46
42

Id.
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 13, 2018 WL
6137618, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 12-13 & n.7 (citing Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d
873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984)).
46
The Receiver cited Farmers & Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520
(10th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that a jury issue should be held to exist as to the
directors’ knowledge of wrongdoing but the facts underlying the fraud were publicly
disclosed in 2011, and the shareholders sued based on them. See Appellant’s
43
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The Receiver’s in pari delicto Argument

The Receiver, however, argued that, as a matter of law, even if
the shareholders knew about the wrongdoing, because a receiver was
involved, he should prevail, nevertheless.47 His argument was as
follows. Under the Doctrine, the persons discovering the wrongdoing
must be “motivated” to seek relief and, he argued, the injured
shareholders could not be deemed “motivated.” 48 According to the
Receiver, had the shareholders sued the Auditors derivatively, the
Auditors would have raised an in pari delicto defense.49 Because the
shareholders would be suing derivatively, through a receiver, they (he)
would be standing in the shoes of CVTI, the wrongdoing entity. This
would be true even though the claims were being brought by
shareholders seeking redress for the Auditor’s alleged wrongdoing,
permitting or encouraging the adverse directors. In other words, the
shareholders would be, in law and according to the Receiver, the
“wrongdoers,” requiring dismissal. Because the shareholders would
have known their derivative action against the Auditors would be
dismissed under an in pari delicto defense, the Receiver argued they
must be deemed, in law, to have been “unmotivated” to bring a suit
they knew they could not win, allowing Domination-based tolling to
occur, despite actual discovery of the facts underlying the claims, for
lack of a motivated person to sue for relief.
The defense argued the outcome of the Receiver’s hypothetical
shareholder derivative action was pure speculation and, moreover, his
“lack of motivation argument” was inconsistent with the fact of the
filing of the initial class suit, and the filing of an amended class
complaint after the initial class claims were dismissed by Judge
Kaplan, which showed the shareholders were, in fact, motivated to

Opening Brief at 34, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381 (9th Cir. 2020)
(No. 18-561767), ECF No. 10. The Defense argued that cases which refuse to
dismiss claims with prejudice because knowledge is an issue of fact do not control
cases in which shareholder knowledge is certain especially where those with
knowledge did sue, in multiple pleadings, on those same facts. See Appellee’s
Answering Brief at 44, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381 (9th Cir.
2020) (No. 18-56176), ECF No. 17.
47
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 1-3.
48
Id. at 17.
49
Id. at 3-4, 10-11.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/8

12

Steckman and Rader: Adverse Domination

2021

ADVERSE DOMINATION

709

seek redress.50 Judge Carney rejected his (hypothetical) in pari delicto
argument. It would allow an injured party to sit by, not suing, despite
knowledge of the facts underlying a fraud, based on his or her own
speculation as to what a court might decide, if such a case were later
brought, by a receiver.51 He held that an injured shareholder must take
action to protect his or her rights or live with the consequences of his
or her inaction, including potentially applicable limitation periods
elapsing.52 The Defense also argued—and Judge Carney held “it is far
from clear that this defense would have completely barred a
shareholder derivative action against Defendants for the acts alleged in
the Complaint,”53 a holding consistent with authority. 54
At oral argument of the Auditors’ dismissal motion, Judge
Carney posed the following question to the Receiver:
THE COURT: …the question I have for you is: The
wrongful conduct is of the people in charge. And if a
derivative case is brought on behalf of the company
because the people in charge are the alleged crooks, I
50

The Receiver distinguished the redress sought in the previously dismissed
securities class action litigation as being brought on behalf of the class plaintiffs, as
individual, shareholders, and not on behalf of the corporate entity, itself. Because
class plaintiffs were not seeking relief on behalf of CVVT, those actions, he argued,
should not preclude Receiver claims filed on behalf of CVVT as opposed to
individual shareholders. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Complaint, supra note 7, at 3 (asserting “[a]lthough generally based on the
same bad acts, the claims previously litigated were direct shareholder claims based
on securities law.”).
51
See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL
6137618, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32.
52
Id. at *9.
53
Id. at *8.
54
The Receiver relied on Rosenfeld v. Zimmer, 254 P.2d 137, 138 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1953), which involved a fraudulent transaction in which plaintiff shareholders
had unclean hands, along with defendant corporation Euclid Properties, Inc., which
falsified loan documents to obtain funds to repay loans made by the Rosenfeld
plaintiffs and another shareholder (Mrs. Coren). It did not involve adverse
domination, just a fraudulent scheme involving shareholders, who were bringing the
derivative action. Id. at 138-40. “[P]laintiffs’ cause of action was barred by the
doctrine of unclean hands of plaintiffs and defendant Euclid, the corporation on
whose behalf plaintiffs instituted the present action,” and “[s]ince the evidence
disclosed that plaintiffs and defendant Euclid had intended to and actually did
misrepresent the facts to the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company in
obtaining a loan from it, by which they hoped to benefit, they came into a court of
equity with unclean hands.” Id. at 138, 140.
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don’t see how that doctrine gets applied to the plaintiff,
because I have those cases all the time. And if I am
understanding what your saying is: The wrongful
conduct of the defendants will prevent a shareholder
who’s truly disinterested and independent from
prevailing. And I’m not following—why is that? 55
The Receiver’s counsel was unable to effectively respond to Judge
Carney’s question.56
Once CVTI’s innocent shareholders discovered the subject
wrongdoing, application of in pari delicto to benefit the Auditors in a
[hypothetical] derivative action would, Judge Carney reasoned, have
been a perversion of the in pari delicto doctrine.57 It would prevent an
injured shareholder from prevailing (on behalf of the company),
through a receiver, against the wrongdoing directors and anyone
allegedly aiding them.58 Judge Carney’s questioning made clear that
it would make no sense to apply in pari delicto in a derivative case
under these circumstances as it would punish innocent shareholders
suing derivatively for CVTI director misconduct and allow an auditor,
if it had really engaged in wrongdoing, to be unjustly enriched
(assuming arguendo it participated in a fraud).59
The Receiver tried to save his claims arguing that whether
CVTI’s shareholders would have been subject to the defense of in
pari delicto required a fact intensive inquiry as to whether the
wrongdoing of the managers should be imputed to the corporation.60

55

Transcript of Proceedings at 17:19-18:3, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV
18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2018), ECF No. 38.
56
Id. at 18-20, 24-27.
57
Id. at 24-27.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Judge Carney cited In re Amerco Derivative Litig, 252 P.3d 681, 694-97 (Nev.
2011) (holding under Nevada law corporation directors’ actions are imputed to the
corporation, remanding the action for a determination of whether the in pari delicto
defense applied), and explained that “an agent’s acts will not be imputed to the
corporation if the ‘adverse interest’ exception applies, which requires the court to
determine whether the agent’s actions were ‘completely and totally adverse to the
corporation.’” Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at
17-18, 2018 WL 6137618, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018). “The ‘adverse interest’
exception is ‘very narrow’ and includes actions such as ‘outright theft or looting or
embezzlement.’” Id. “If the agent’s wrongdoing benefits the corporation in any way,
the exception does not apply. If the court determines the director or officer’s acts
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Under California law, such determination requires the court to assess
whether “(1) the public cannot be protected because the transaction
has been completed, (2) serious moral turpitude is involved, (3) the
defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault, and (4) to apply
the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the plaintiff.”61 Judge Carney stated he thought it far from
clear the in pari delicto defense “would have completely barred a
shareholder derivative action against Defendants for the acts alleged
in the Complaint.”62
Judge Carney noted that although the Receiver alleged
CVTI’s former directors and officers entered into transactions to
funnel money to their personal benefit, which could constitute a “total
abandonment” of CVTI’s interest, the adverse interest exception
would prevent the imputation of their acts to CVTI. 63 The fact that
CVTI may have benefited from some of these transactions, indicated,
to him, CVTI was “not completely harmed by the transactions,” as it
would have acquired ownership interest in the companies.64 If CVTI
benefited, the adverse interest exception would not apply—and, thus,
he concluded “It is too speculative to assume that the defense of in
pari delicto would apply to CVVT’s shareholders.”65
should be imputed to the corporation, it must then make a secondary determination
of whether the defense of in pari delicto should apply to the action at issue.” Id.
61
Id. at 17 (citing In re Amerco Derivative Litig, 252 P.3d at 696); see also Maudlin
v. Pac. Decision Scis. Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 732-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
62
Seiden, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 17, 2018 WL 6137618, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32.
63
Id. at 17-18.
64
Id. at 17. In fact, and in addition, the Receiver’s allegation is that prior to the
disclosure of the wrongdoing and the theft of funds by the CVTI insiders, CVTI was
benefitted by more than $60 million. Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 2.
65
Seiden, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 17-18, 2018 WL 6137618, at *8
(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32. The Receiver appealed Judge Carney’s
dismissal of his complaint. See Notice of Appeal, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No.
SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. August 29, 2018), ECF No. 33. He argued,
in part based on an argument that the finding that his in pari delicto argument was
“speculative,” should not have resulted in dismissal, but rather a determination by
the trial court of whether, in fact, an in pari delicto defense against a shareholder
derivative action would have been meritorious. See Appellant’s Opening Brief,
supra note 46, at 31-32. Judge Carney was overly generous—consideration of the
Maudlin factors shows a hypothetical in pari delicto defense, raised in a hypothetical
derivative action, would likely have failed. See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra
note 46, at 33-40. First, protecting the public and preventing wrongdoers from
benefiting from their conduct, was absent as all alleged wrongdoing and all
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Whether an action by CVTI’s shareholders against the
auditors would have been successful, he concluded, was, in any
event, not the point of the adverse domination doctrine regarding
whether an informed shareholder or director had the “ability” to
sue.66 Rather, he explained: “the mere existence of a potential barrier
to suing” does not negate the “ability to enforce a corporate cause of
transactions related thereto were completed by the time of public dissemination of
the underlying facts in January 2011—applying in pari delicto would have injured
innocent shareholders and protected those accused of wrongdoing, allowing unjust
enrichment. Id. at 34. Second, preventing a shareholder derivative action due to in
pari delicto or unclean hands would allow the auditor to retain the purported benefit
of its wrongful conduct and thus be unjustly enriched at the expense of CVTI and its
shareholders, which would make no sense. Id. at 35. Third, while an in pari delicto
defense can be asserted in a derivative action, the defense “must not be applied where
to do so would create an injustice.” Hill v. Younkin, 79 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1969).
[T]he fundamental purpose of the [in pari delicto] rule must always be
kept in mind, and the realities of the situation must be considered. Where,
by applying the rule, the public cannot be protected because the
transaction has been completed, where no serious moral turpitude is
involved, where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault,
and where to apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, the rule should not be applied . . .
. [I]n some cases, . . . effective deterrence is best realized by enforcing the
plaintiff's claim rather than leaving the defendant in possession of the
benefit; or the forfeiture resulting from unenforceability is
disproportionately harsh considering the nature of the illegality. In each
case, how the aims of policy can best be achieved depends on the kind of
illegality and the particular facts involved.

Maudlin, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 732 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Accordingly, the Auditors’ counsel argued that it was not particularly “speculative”
how a court would have decided whether to apply an in pari delicto defense—it was
virtually certain that it would have been denied. Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra
note 46, at 39. The Ninth Circuit would likely hold that had the purported in pari
delicto defense been raised, it would not have been viable under controlling
precedent which holds that in pari delicto “must not be applied where to do so would
create an injustice.” Hill, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 512; Maudlin, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 732
(“how the aims of policy can best be achieved depends on the kind of illegality and
the particular facts involved.”); Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court, applying the
same standards set forth in Maudlin, reversed a finding that an in pari delicto defense
precluded a derivative action. In re Amerco Derivative Litig, 252 P.3d at 694-97
(reversing dismissal of derivative action in reliance on in pari delicto doctrine,
holding collusion of corporate insiders with third parties did not deprive corporation
of standing to sue third parties). See also Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note
46, at 39-40.
66
See Seiden, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 18, 2018 WL 6137618, at *9
(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32.
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action.”67 He set forth the central question regarding the adverse
domination doctrine:
The central question animating the discovery rule, and
the corollary doctrine of adverse domination, is whether
someone could have discovered wrongdoing, and
sought redress. To speculate as to the potential outcome
of a wholly separate action is outside the scope of the
adverse domination inquiry. Indeed, for the Court to
determine whether CVVT’s shareholders were subject
to the defense of in pari delicto would essentially
require a mini-trial on the merits of another litigation,
before the Court could address the merits of this
action.68
Record evidence of multiple prior litigations and public disclosure of
the facts through the 2011 Citron Report showed the shareholders
knew the facts, including the existence and effect of Defendants’
wrongdoing—“the majority of Plaintiff’s present allegations . . .
provided constructive notice of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing in the
course of their auditing engagement with CVVT.” 69 Judge Carney
relied on the reasoning of In re Emerald Casino, Inc.,70 in which the
Seventh Circuit held “the mere existence of a potential barrier to suing”
does not negate the ability “to enforce a corporate cause of action.” 71
In Emerald Casino, a Chapter 7 trustee had sued former casino
officers, directors and shareholders for, among other things, breach of
fiduciary duties in connection with the casino’s loss of its gaming
license.72 The cause of action accrued in 2001, but the Chapter 7
trustee did not sue until 2008, beyond the five-year statute of limitation
under Illinois law.73 The trustee argued the Doctrine tolled the statute
of limitations when the corporation was controlled by the wrongdoing
officers or directors, but the trial judge held the Doctrine was
67

In re Emerald Casino, Inc., 867 F.3d 743, 762 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying the
Doctrine and rejecting plaintiff trustee’s argument that creditor’s committee lacked
the “ability” to sue because it could not have successfully brought a derivative claim
on behalf of the corporation for lack of standing) (citations omitted).
68
Seiden, 2018 WL 6137618, at *9.
69
Id.
70
867 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2017).
71
Id. at 762 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
72
Id. at 760-763.
73
Id.
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inapplicable because the Chapter 11 creditor’s committee had the
knowledge, ability and motivation to sue before the case was converted
to a Chapter 7 but chose not to do so.74 On appeal, the Chapter 7 trustee
argued the committee was unable to sue because it did not have
derivative standing to assert claims against the directors and officers,
and therefore, the creditor’s committee was not “motivated” to pursue
the lawsuit because a gaming license sale was pending during the
period.75 The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The fact that the bankruptcy
court might have denied derivative standing to the creditor’s
committee was insufficient to demonstrate the committee could not sue
for redress.76 Even if the committee lacked the motivation to sue, that
would not alter the outcome—“would-be plaintiffs must live with their
choice. A plaintiff d[oes] not lack motivation to sue just because its
chosen course of action proved to be unsuccessful in the end.” 77
Judge Carney found the Receiver failed to meet his burden. He
did not show a sufficient basis to avail himself of equitable tolling
under the Doctrine and he could not shield his claims from a dismissal
by speculating how a possible in pari delicto defense would have
turned out.78 He dismissed the Receiver’s claims, with prejudice,
notwithstanding it was a first time on pleading. 79 Nothing could
change the dates of the relevant events including the dates during
which the Auditors were engaged and the time the Citron Report
publicly disclosed the gravamen of the factual case that resulted in,
inter alia, the shareholder class action, naming one of the auditor
defendants, nor subsequent multiple SEC actions and a derivative
litigation, not naming the Auditors. The Receiver appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.80
III.

THE ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF

74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 763.
78
See In re Verit Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 61, at *3 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
plaintiff did not meet the burden to invoke the adverse domination theory because
the transactions at issue were disclosed in filings with the SEC, and the corporation’s
largest shareholder sued the company’s directors for claims asserted in the plaintiff’s
complaint).
79
See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 19, 2018
WL 6137618, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32.
80
See Notice of Appeal, supra note 65.
75
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APPEALS
A.

Ninth Circuit Ruling on Adverse Domination

On appeal, the two central questions, as in the trial court, were
how to properly understand the Doctrine and, in particular, its relation
to shareholder knowledge of facts showing wrongdoing and whether
the in pari delicto defense, as the Receiver attempted to use it, should
be construed to save his claims. 81 The Defense began by setting forth
the traditional formulation of the Doctrine: “[I]t is generally held that
an action for fraud committed against a corporation is tolled for the
period that those responsible for the fraud remain in control of the
corporation. The principle does not apply after discovery of the fraud
by a protesting stockholder.”82 In other words, shareholder discovery
of the facts of a fraud defeats Domination-based tolling where
domination is so extensive that it prevents discovery of wrongdoing
sufficient to allow a shareholder to seek relief. 83
81

Specifically, the Receiver argued any shareholder derivative action against the
Auditors, prior to the Receiver’s appointment, would have been subject to an in pari
delicto defense. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 17. CVVT
shareholders would have had no motivation to bring a derivative action prior to the
Receiver’s appointment, he argued, even if they knew of the corporate wrongdoing
and the involvement of the Auditors, because such a suit would have been futile and
subject to dismissal based on principles of in pari delicto. Id. Thus, even if the
wrongdoing were previously discovered, the Doctrine would still serve to toll the
limitations period until appointment of the Receiver, who would not be subject to the
in pari delicto defense. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d
17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[D]efenses based on a party’s unclean hands or inequitable
conduct do not generally apply against that party’s receiver.”).
82
Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (internal
citations omitted) involved the potential tolling of a limitations period when those
directors responsible for the fraud remained in control of the company. Id. Although
Burt did not involve a receiver, there is no special rule as to application of the
Doctrine for receivers.
83
See Smith v. Superior Ct., 266 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing San
Leandro Canning Co. v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026, 1028 (Cal. 1931)) (one of the
Receiver’s lead authorities for the proposition—“A statute of limitations tolls when
a claim arises from a director’s or employee’s defalcation and the wrongdoers’
control makes discovery impossible.”) (emphasis added). Smith also cited Admiralty
Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“near
absolute control can place the shareholder . . . in a position of incapacity, and may
make discovery of any wrongdoing impossible . . . if . . . in fact the dishonest
president and other high ranking officers controlled the Fund’s operations to such
an extent as to preclude discovery, the tolling of a discovery-of-loss provision should
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The Receiver relied on three cases showing, he argued, that his
interpretation of the Doctrine was correct, namely Whitten v. Dabney,84
San Leandro Canning Co. v. Perillo,85 and Damian v. A-Mark
Precious Metals, Inc.86 His argument on appeal was that, even if a
shareholder knows of actionable misconduct and has the ability and
incentive to seek redress, under California State law, the limitations
period is not tolled until the removal of the directors exercising adverse
control.87 Accordingly, a shareholder or a later appointed receiver still
gets the benefit of tolling to file his own claims, despite shareholder
knowledge, as long as the adverse domination is ongoing, regardless
of whether shareholders obtain knowledge of the wrongdoing prior to
removal of the adverse directors and regardless of any statute of
limitation.88
The Receiver argued the cases Judge Carney cited in support
of his decision were all improperly relied upon, namely Burt v. Irvine
Co.,89 Smith v. Superior Court,90 Admiralty Fund v. Peerless, Inc.

be considered.”) (emphasis added). The Receiver contended these cases were
inconsistent with his lead authorities, discussed immediately below.
84
154 P. 312 (Cal. 1915).
85
295 P. 1026 (Cal. 1931).
86
No. CV 16-7198 FMO (SSx), 2017 WL 6940515 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017).
87
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 24-27.
88
The Receiver also advanced this argument in the District Court but, on appeal,
focused more on Whitten, arguing Whitten treated the adversely dominated
corporation as an “infant” under the law, without standing to sue and, therefore, the
limitation period should be tolled as against an adversely dominated corporation until
adverse director(s) were expelled, regardless of whether shareholders knew of the
alleged wrongdoing during the adversely dominated corporation’s period of
“infancy,” when the wrong-doing directors were in place. See Appellant’s Opening
Brief, supra note 46, at 21-23. The Receiver urged that the doctrine of stare decisis
should have compelled the District Court to ignore the large body of California case
law from California’s lower courts which provided that statutes of limitations under
the adverse domination doctrine are not tolled when shareholders of the adversely
dominated company have knowledge of the basis for a civil action and an incentive
to seek redress for the wrongful acts of those dominating the company. Id. at 3-5.
His theory regarding the predominance of Whitten was contingent on the Ninth
Circuit concluding Whitten stood for the proposition that adverse domination created
an absolute limitations toll, regardless of whether or when corporation shareholders
had prior knowledge of the basis for claims of wrongdoing. The Auditors disputed
his interpretation of Whitten. See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 46, at 2430.
89
47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
90
266 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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Co.,91 Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,92 Healthtrac, Inc.
v. Sinclair,93 and California Union Insurance Company v. Am.
Diversified Sav. Bank.94 All of these cases had held the Doctrine
precludes tolling where, despite domination, shareholders obtain
knowledge of the wrongdoing and have the ability and motivation to
seek redress. The Receiver argued each was wrongly decided because
they did not follow what the Receiver called the “Whitten rule.”95 He
argued these California Court of Appeals cases and cases before the
Ninth Circuit must all be disregarded in favor of (his interpretation) of
the California Supreme Court precedent, Whitten. He also argued
Ninth Circuit decisions in Mosesian and the district court decision in
Healthtrac were federal question cases involving interpretation of
federal common law, not California law and so both should be
disregarded, under controlling California Supreme Court authority. 96
The Receiver’s central argument was that Whitten sets forth a
bright-line, allegedly well-settled “rule” with respect to interpretation
of the adverse domination doctrine, namely that if a company is
controlled by principals accused of bad acts which harm the company,
all statutes of limitations on claims against the company (arising from
the bad acts) are tolled during such periods of domination, regardless
of whether (and when) the company’s shareholders might obtain
knowledge of the existence of potential claims and their ability to sue
regarding same.
The Auditors argued the Receiver’s interpretation was
incorrect. In Whitten, a shareholder was held by the trial courts to be
time-barred from seeking relief because a different shareholder had
become aware of the subject fraud but did not sue. 97 The question was
whether the first shareholder’s knowledge commenced the limitation
period for the second shareholder, then unaware of the fraud and only
having recently learned of the facts. 98 The Whitten Court held the first
shareholder’s knowledge did not bar the second from filing suit
91

191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 757-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984).
93
302 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1127-28 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
94
948 F.2d 556, 565 (9th Cir. 1991).
95
See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Robert W. Seiden, Receiver for China
Valves Technology, Inc. at 12-20, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381
(9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-561767), ECF No. 30.
96
Id. at 14-15.
97
See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 46, at 25-27.
98
Id.
92

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2021], Art. 8

718

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

because he was not in a position to know the facts underlying the
fraud—the Whitten Court explained:
It is susceptible of demonstration that the first
stockholder knew of all these matters and that as to him
this right of action may be barred. Is this also a bar to
the prosecution of the same action by another
stockholder who has acted promptly upon learning of
the fraud? Clearly this cannot be so . . . . [E]ven if it be
said (and in saying it we do not decide it) that such a
complaint as this shows that the plaintiff stockholder
has waited too long before commencing his action, and
that therefore the plea of the statute of limitations must
be sustained against his action, this does not operate as
a bar to the corporate rights when prosecuted by another
stockholder . . . .Whatever, therefore may have been the
rights of the Providence stockholders to prosecute this
action after notice, the right of these plaintiffs is not
barred under their allegation that they first acquired
notice and knowledge of the efforts of the Providence
stockholders in 1910.99
Whitten’s result was predicated on the fact that a stockholder who
lacked knowledge would not be barred by the limitation period if he
“acted promptly upon learning of the fraud.” 100
In contrast to Whitten, all the CVTI stockholders knew (or
should have known) the underlying facts sufficient to bring a claim
since at least January 2011 when the Citron Report was published,
99

Whitten v. Dabney, 154 P. 312, 315-16 (Cal. 1915). The California Official
Reports Headnotes from the Whitten case, though non-binding, are instructive: “The
provision of the statute of limitations applicable to such action by a stockholder is
subdivision 4 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that actions
for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake must be commenced within three years,
but that the cause of action is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery,
by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” Whitten v.
Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 622 (1915).
100
Whitten, 154 P. at 315. Whitten did not decide on the (hypothetical) rights of the
1906 shareholders—it stated it was not deciding whether a shareholder who “waited
too long” could be the one to initiate an action on behalf of the adversely dominated
company. Id. (“[E]ven if it can be said (and in saying it we do not decide it) that
such a complaint . . . shows that the Plaintiff stockholder has waited too long . . . this
does not operate as a bar to the corporate rights when prosecuted by another
stockholder [who was not on inquiry notice of the claims]).” Id. at 316.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/8

22

Steckman and Rader: Adverse Domination

2021

ADVERSE DOMINATION

719

disclosing same. The Receiver’s claims, in contrast, were time-barred
because the public, including all the shareholders, who did, in fact, sue,
discovered or could have discovered the basis for the Receiver’s claims
against the Auditors before the court appointed a receiver.101 The
limitation periods for all the Receiver’s claims were triggered in
January 2011, when the facts were publicly disclosed. 102 The Receiver
argued Judge Carney erroneously looked to California’s discovery rule
rather than Whitten,103 but no court has held Whitten stands for the
proposition for which the Receiver argued—nor has any court held
knowledge and filing of multiple pleadings based on the same
gravamen of facts should be ignored in assessing whether the Doctrine
should resuscitate otherwise time-barred and, in Seiden, already
adjudicated claims. The Receiver’s interpretation of Whitten was just
wrong.
The Receiver’s second lead authority, San Leandro Canning
Co., involved neither a receiver, nor parties with knowledge of a fraud,
nor parties with an incentive and ability to sue for redress, let alone
ones who actually did sue on the same facts. 104 Like Whitten, San
Leandro expressed a reasonable proposition, namely that where a
company is dominated by fraudulent directors, the limitation period
may, in some circumstances, be tolled—but it did not deal with the
situation presented in Seiden, where the facts of the fraud were
available to every shareholder and actually sued upon.105 San Leandro
does not stand for the proposition that a receiver gets to revive timebarred claims where domination does not prevent shareholders from
obtaining knowledge of claims just because a receiver is appointed
after the limitation period runs.

101

Whitten did not involve a receiver trying to revive stale claims where people,
knowing the same facts, had already sought redress in court. Whitten did not even
rely on the Doctrine. It involved a statutory interpretation and application of the
statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 338. See
Whitten, 154 P. at 315 (“[T]he right to prosecute the action is governed by the
provisions of section 338, subdivision 4 . . . .”).
102
See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 14-15 &
n.8, 2018 WL 6137618, at *7 n.8 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32.
103
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 24-25.
104
See San Leandro Canning., Co v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026 (Cal. 1931).
105
Id.
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Plaintiff’s third lead authority, Damian v. A-Mark Precious
Metals, Inc.,106 contains a correct statement of the rules governing the
Doctrine: “In California, under the doctrine of adverse domination, a
statute of limitations tolls when a claim arises from a director’s or
employee’s defalcation and the wrongdoers’ control makes discovery
impossible.”107 The Receiver omitted this quote from his citation and
analysis of Damian.108 The CVTI executives’ wrongdoing did not
“make discovery impossible” and the allegations which formed the
gravamen of the Receiver’s Complaint were discovered and litigated—
the law is that tolling is appropriate where control prevents discovery
of facts sufficient to seek redress, not where it does not.109
The Receiver, in his opening appellate brief, argued he should
be deemed to be like an “infant,” unable to discover facts that would
allow him to timely sue to vindicate the CVTT shareholders’ rights, a
106

2017 WL 6940515 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017). In citing Damian, the Receiver
relied on a non-binding, inapposite authority. Towards the end of the Damian
decision, just prior to the conclusion, the following statement appears in bold: “This
Order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or submitted
to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.” Id. Nonetheless, District Judge
Carney’s dismissal of the Receiver’s Complaint did address the Receiver’s reliance
on Damian stating:
Plaintiff’s reliance on Damian v. A-Mark Precious Metals, Inc., is
misplaced. In Damian, the court found that the two directors controlled
the receivership entities, which precluded the possibility of an action
against them until the receiver was appointed. However, the court in
Damian did not engage in any analysis regarding whether the facts of the
alleged fraudulent transfer and fraud claims were discoverable prior to the
receiver’s appointment, nor were there facts in the record suggesting that
those claims were previously discoverable.

Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 6137618
at *7 n.9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018) (internal citations omitted).
107
Damian, 2017 WL 6940515 at *8, (quoting Smith v. Superior Ct., 266 Cal. Rptr.
253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) and citing San Leandro Canning Co., 295 P. at 1028.
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)).
108
See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 6,
16.
109
See generally Beal v. Smith, 189 P. 341, 345 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920) (adverse
domination does not toll limitations “against an innocent stockholder who was
without knowledge of the fraud.”) (citing Whitten, 154 P. 312) (emphasis added);
Pour Roy v. Gardner, 10 P. 2d 815, 819 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932) (emphasis added)
(“[W]here the circumstances are such as to put a person of ordinary intelligence and
prudence on inquiry, or where there are gross laches in not making any effort to
discover the real facts which might have been discovered by the use of slight
diligence, the statute of limitations cannot be avoided, and the knowledge which thus
might have been obtained is imputed as of the time of the commission of the fraud.”).
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form of “incapacity.”110 Unlike an infant who cannot bring an action
to protect his or a company’s rights, however, the Defense argued the
Receiver was appointed after the shareholders had already learned of
the wrongdoing and after five cases litigated the facts. The Defense
argued, moreover, that whereas the “minority” of an infant reasonably
justifies tolling so the infant, upon reaching majority, can make a
reasoned decision whether to bring an action, no comparable
“disability” should save the Receiver’s claims. 111 Unlike an infant,
with neither knowledge or ability to sue to protect his rights, CVTI
shareholders had both knowledge and ability—and they sued.112 The
Doctrine had been held inapplicable where a stockholder did discover
the fraud,113 and that rule, the Defense argued, was wholly consistent
with applicable discovery rules:
Under the [California] discovery rule, the statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or
should suspect that her injury was caused by
wrongdoing and that someone has done something
wrong to her . . . . A plaintiff need not be aware of the
specific facts necessary to establish the claim; that is a
process contemplated by pretrial discovery . . . . So long
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 25-27.
See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 46, at 14-15.
112
The Receiver relied on Goldberg v. Berry, 247 N.Y.S. 69, 75 (N.Y. App. Div.
1930) to support his assertion that knowledge should not defeat Doctrine-based
tolling but, in Goldberg, the court held the knowledge of one shareholder did not
trigger the limitation period running as to shareholders who lacked that knowledge
so persons unaware of a claim (due to domination) would not be compromised by
the fact that one person with knowledge could have sued but chose not to do so, for
his own reasons. The Receiver also cited Allen v. Wilkerson, 396 S.W.2d 493, 50102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) for the proposition that notice to shareholders does not start
the limitation period running but, in Allen, one shareholder knew of the wrongdoing
and could have brought a derivative suit. The court held one shareholder’s
knowledge and decision not to sue should not prejudice other shareholders, lacking
such knowledge. Id. Allen, notably, relied on Goldberg and Whitten, both involving
situations where one shareholder had knowledge, but others did not, and courts ruling
knowledge of one shareholder should not compromise the rights of other
shareholders, lacking such knowledge. Id.
113
See Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (“[I]t is
generally held that an action for fraud committed against a corporation is tolled for
the period that those responsible for the fraud remain in control of the corporation.
The principle does not apply after discovery of the fraud by a protesting stockholder
. . . .”).
110
111
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as a suspicion exists, it is clear that a plaintiff must go
find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her. 114
The Receiver argued, as he did in the trial court: “To the extent
necessary, the Receiver asserts the doctrine of equitable tolling in this
matter . . .” and that “the domination of CVVT by the executives who
committed the bad acts with Defendants made discovery of the bad
acts by the Receiver impossible until sometime after the appointment
of the Receiver and the removal of the bad actors.” 115 The Defense
responded there should be no equitable tolling because the Receiver
failed to plead facts which, if proved, supported his theory.116
Citing Allen v. Ramsay, the court explained:
A receiver occupies no better position than that which
was occupied by the person or party for whom he acts
and the receiver takes the property and the rights of one
for whom he was appointed in the same condition and
subject to the same equities as existed before his
appointment and any defense good against the original
party is good against the receiver. 117
In language particularly apposite, the court explained:
The showing of excuse for late filing must be made in
the complaint. Formal averments or general
conclusions to the effect that the facts were not
discovered until a stated date, and that the plaintiff
could not reasonably have made an earlier discovery,
are useless. The complaint must set forth specifically
(1) the facts of the time and manner of discovery; and
(2) the circumstances which excuse the failure to have
made an earlier discovery.118

114

Apple Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Vavrinek, Trine, Day & Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d
629, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 92728 (Cal. 1998)). The defense noted other courts reached similar conclusions, citing
In re Marvel Ent. Grp., Inc., 273 B.R. 58, 75 (D. Del. 2002) (holding that the
Doctrine is essentially a corollary of the discovery rule—under the Doctrine—“the
statute of limitations is allowed to run once someone has sufficient knowledge and
ability to seek redress on the corporation's behalf.”).
115
Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 6.
116
See Mills v. Forestex Co., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 286-87 (Cal Ct. App. 2003).
117
Allen v. Ramsay, 4 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
118
Id. at 581.
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The Complaint alleged no such circumstances or excuse, 119 just that
CVTI was dominated and the Receiver alleging that this, in itself,
entitled him to equitable tolling. He disregarded the rest of the rule,
limiting Doctrine-based tolling to cases where defrauding party control
was not negated by the possibility an informed and motivated
shareholder or director could seek redress.120
The Ninth Circuit began by observing the Receiver’s case
turned on Doctrine interpretation which, as the trial court held, requires
a showing of such substantial control by corrupt insiders that discovery
of their wrongdoing is made impossible. 121 It noted that the Ninth
119

In Denholm v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 912 F.2d 357, 362 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth
Circuit held that: “[t]o obtain the benefit of the late-discovery exception to the statute
of limitations, the complaint must allege facts showing that the cause of action could
not with reasonable diligence have been discovered prior to three years before the
suit.” To access adverse domination tolling, plaintiff must “show full, complete and
exclusive control in the directors or officers charged”—and they can do so in just
one way, namely, by “effectively negat[ing] the possibility that an informed
stockholder or director could have induced the corporation to sue.” Mosesian v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984). The Receiver, in his
reply brief, euphemistically referred to the facts he pleaded as “similar” facts. See
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 8-9. But reading the paragraphs
containing the same factual allegations, side by side, revealed that he had just
parroted allegations from the pleadings of earlier filed class, derivative and SEC
complaints. Appellee’s Supplemental Excerpts of the Record at Ex. A, Supp. ER
007-10, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. Appx. 381 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 1856176).
120
The Receiver argued that because his claims were neither “class claims” nor
“derivative claims,” his claims, despite being based on the same facts, were not
brought previously, see Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 9-11, and that
he should be able to now bring his claims, even though they were previously
interposed as the substantive predicate of at least five litigated complaints. See Notice
of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Ex. A to Declaration of Lawrence A.
Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal.
June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. No. 2. The Auditors argued that no case has held
that the adverse domination doctrine mandates that suit be brought in any particular
form, e.g., a private, class or derivative pleading but, rather, only that facts sufficient
to allow “redress” to be sought by a person with an incentive and ability to seek to
remedy for damage the adverse domination has caused. Id. The Defense further
argued that the shareholders, in their previous class suit, could have sued for common
law fraud, aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach and contract breach, the latter,
potentially, as a third-party beneficiary of the subject written engagements, as well
as on theories of negligence and gross negligence—they could and did seek “redress”
based on the same facts as those upon which the Receiver’s claims were based. Id.
121
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing
Smith v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal Ct. App. 1990); Admiralty
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Circuit had previously held Doctrine-based tolling was unavailable
where discovery of the alleged bad acts was possible, notwithstanding
control by the wrongdoers.122 The Defense had cited California Union
Insurance Co. v. American Diversified Savings Bank,123 a Ninth
Circuit case interpreting the Doctrine under California law, which the
Receiver argued was wrongly decided in light of (his interpretation of)
Whitten,124 but the Receiver’s argument was rejected on procedural
and interpretive grounds:
Seiden argues that California Union was wrongly
decided because it failed to follow Whitten v. Dabney,
154 P. 312 (Cal. 1915), which he claims stands for the
proposition that equitable tolling under the doctrine of
adverse domination applies whenever a corporation is
controlled by corrupt insiders. This argument fails for
two reasons. First, even if we agreed with Seiden, a
three-judge panel of this court is not at liberty to
overrule California Union’s construction of California
law. Second, we disagree that there is any tension
between Whitten and California Union’s interpretation
of the adverse domination doctrine. In Whitten, certain
shareholders and directors conspired to defraud the
corporation they controlled, and “sedulously
Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 758–59 (Ct. Ct. App. 1983); Burt v.
Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)).
122
Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified Savings Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 565–66
(9th Cir. 1991).
123
948 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1991).
124
Whitten v. Dabney, 154 P. 312 (Cal. 1915). California federal courts have
interpreted and applied the Doctrine in the same manner as California’s state courts.
The Defense explained in its brief “[t]o exploit Doctrine tolling, the party bringing
suit must have been unable to discover the wrongdoing and, so, been unable to seek
redress to remedy adverse effects of domination.” Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra
note 46, at 22. See Cal. Union Ins. Co., 948 F.2d at 565 (noting this Doctrine “may
be appropriate in situations where there is such domination and control as to preclude
non-wrongdoing employees from discovery”) (emphasis added); Mosesian, 727 F.2d
at 879 (holding that to establish equitable tolling under the adverse domination
doctrine, a receiver must establish both: (1) exclusive control and domination by
corrupt directors and (2) the inability of other shareholders or employees to discover
the wrongdoing of the directors) (emphasis added); In re Marvel Ent. Grp., Inc., 273
B.R. 58, 75 (D. Del. 2002) (under the Doctrine—“[T]he statute of limitations is
allowed to run once someone has sufficient knowledge and ability to seek redress on
the corporation's behalf.”).
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concealed” their self-dealing from innocent
shareholders. 154 P. at 315. On these facts, the
California Supreme Court held that director
malfeasance tolled the statute of limitations for an
innocent shareholder’s claim, filed promptly after that
shareholder’s discovery of the wrongdoing. Id. at 314–
16. That is perfectly consistent with California
Union.125
The Ninth Circuit then turned specifically to the facts before it,
explaining and holding:
[U]ncontroverted evidence demonstrates that, well
within the statute of limitations, CVVT’s shareholders
discovered or should have discovered the wrongdoing
Seiden alleges. Specifically, in 2011, the same year a
Citron Research report publicized CVVT’s alleged
wrongdoing, shareholders sought redress in a classaction lawsuit against both CVVT and Frazer Frost, as
well as a derivative lawsuit against CVVT. In 2014, the
SEC filed a fraud action against CVVT. As the district
court observed, “[t]he SEC had the ability to uncover
the facts relevant to Plaintiff’s causes of actions and
make them public.” Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No.
8:18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 6137618, at *6
(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018). Indeed, all of these actions
implicated Frazer Frost in the wrongdoing Seiden now
alleges. Accordingly, the district court properly held
that adverse domination did not toll Seiden’s claims.
Cf. Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727
F.2d 873, 876–79 (9th Cir. 1984).126
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2020). See Cal.
Union Ins. Co., 948 F.2d at 565 (holding that the Doctrine “may be appropriate in
situations where there is such domination and control as to preclude non-wrongdoing
employees from discovery.”) (emphasis added). The Doctrine, however, has never
been held to resuscitate stale claims where knowledge is sufficient to allow a party
with incentive to seek “redress” to do so. Seiden, 796 Fed. App’x at 382-83.
126
Seiden, 796 Fed. App’x at 383. In Mosesian, the Ninth Circuit held that to
establish equitable tolling under the adverse domination doctrine, a receiver must
establish both: (1) exclusive control and domination by corrupt directors and (2) the
inability of other shareholders or employees to discover the wrongdoing of the
directors). 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984). The Receiver relied heavily on
125
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Turning to the Receiver’s in pari delicto argument, the Ninth
Circuit explained and held:
The district court also properly held that CVVT
shareholders were able to seek redress for the
wrongdoing Seiden alleges here. Seiden argues that
notwithstanding
Frazer
Frost’s
wrongdoing,
shareholders had no ability to sue Frazer Frost prior
to his appointment as Receiver because Frazer Frost
would have had an ironclad in pari delicto defense.
Seiden is incorrect. Even if Frazer Frost had a
plausible in pari delicto defense against derivative
claims brought by CVVT shareholders, defenses—
hypothetical or otherwise—do not toll otherwise
applicable statutes of limitations. The district court
correctly determined that Seiden’s failure to plead
adverse domination could not be cured by any
amendment.127
Had derivative claims against the Auditors been barred by the in pari
delicto doctrine, it would have resulted in a windfall to the (alleged)
wrongdoing auditor which would have created a gross injustice,
contrary to the policies underlying the equitable in pari delicto
doctrine. Preventing shareholders in a derivative action from
recovering from a third-party due to the wrongdoing of directors in
cahoots with the third party would have been a miscarriage of justice.
IV.

KIRSCHNER V. KPMG: APPLICABILITY OF THE IN PARI
DELICTO DEFENSE TO A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION

Rosenfeld v. Zimmer, 254 P.2d 137, 138-40 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1953), which
involved a fraudulent transaction in which the plaintiff shareholders, Victor and
Morris Rosenfeld, had unclean hands, along with defendant corporation Euclid
Properties, Inc., which falsified loan documents to obtain funds to repay loans made
by the Rosenfeld plaintiffs and another shareholder (Mrs. Coren). Rosenfeld did not
involve adverse domination, but, rather, a fraudulent scheme involving the
shareholders, themselves, who were bringing the derivative action. Id. (“[C]ause of
action was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands of plaintiffs [Victor and Morris
Rosenfeld] and defendant Euclid, the corporation on whose behalf plaintiffs
instituted the present action . . . [s]ince the evidence disclosed that plaintiffs and
defendant Euclid had intended to and actually did misrepresent the facts to the
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company in obtaining a loan from it, by which
they hoped to benefit, they came into a court of equity with unclean hands.”).
127
Seiden, 796 F. App'x at 383 (emphasis added).
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FILED AGAINST AN OUTSIDE AUDITOR
Interpretation of the adverse domination doctrine urged by the
Receiver, were it adopted, would allow for and encourage collusion
between a receiver and shareholders who failed to act within the
limitations period, for their own purposes. Shareholders with actual
knowledge of wrongdoing and the motivation to seek redress could
elide the statute of limitations by seeking appointment of a receiver
who could litigate claims, about which the shareholders knew, but
failed to act, notwithstanding all the policies underlying why limitation
periods exist,128 and regardless of how stale the claims had become.
This is not the law and never has been the law, as the trial and Ninth
Circuit decisions in Seiden make clear.
Apparently recognizing this, the Receiver fell back on the
argument that a shareholder’s derivative action against the Auditors
would not have been brought because the shareholders would have
Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of Limitations:
Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454, 464-66 (1993) (quoting Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987)) (“Statutes
of limitations are designed to protect defendants by giving them repose. Defendants
do not have to live their entire lives fearing that they will be sued for past deeds. As
a result, time-bars help stabilize commercial and property transactions. With a known
period of liability, defendants can arrange their personal and commercial lives
accordingly. They can also collect and preserve evidence against the possibility of
suit while the evidence is fresh. Moreover, time-bars protect defendants from unfair
surprise and the prejudice of having to defend themselves years after the claim arose
when the evidence and witnesses may be scarce or lost. Statutes of limitations thus
force plaintiffs to assert their claims in a timely fashion when the evidence and
witnesses' memories are fresh. Periods of limitations also assist the courts, and thus
society, by preserving resources and promoting the legitimacy of the judicial process.
They play a major role in reducing the courts' crowded dockets by deterring litigants
from filing most time-barred claims. Untimely claims that are filed can usually be
dismissed in a pretrial motion. As a result, the courts do not have to waste valuable
time and resources litigating stale claims. More importantly, statutes of limitations
promote accuracy and fairness. Through time-bars the courts avoid dealing with
unreliable witnesses and stale, or even false, evidence. Discussing the policies
underlying statutes of limitations, the Supreme Court has said: ‘A federal cause of
action “brought at any distance of time” would be “utterly repugnant to the genius of
our laws.” Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage
of time, the memories of witnesses have faded, or evidence is lost. In compelling
circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be
forgotten.’ Finally, to the extent that the public perceives that time-bars prevent
frivolous claims and promote accuracy, they also help preserve the public's
perception of the courts' legitimacy.”).
128
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known they would have lost and, therefore, that knowledge would have
negated their motivation to seek derivative suit redress. Per the
Receiver’s argument, CVTI shareholders’ potential knowledge of the
wrongdoing by the controlling directors (and the alleged parallel
wrongdoing of the Auditors) should not terminate the tolling of the
limitations period because, in their view, a successful shareholder’s
derivative action was never feasible. 129
Both Judge Carney and the Ninth Circuit rejected the
Receiver’s argument. Judge Carney found that the Receiver’s theory
that the Auditors could dismiss an derivative action based on in pari
delicto was speculative and contrary to good policy—after all, in that
context, the Auditors, who allegedly aided and abetted the fraud,
would be able to escape liability for claims brought, albeit derivatively,
by the victims of the fraud, namely the shareholders. 130 Judge Carney
did not definitively determine that an in pari delicto defense in a
derivative action brought against the auditors would have failed.
Rather, he found the Receiver’s assertions “too speculative to assume
that the defense of in pari delicto would apply to CVVT’s
shareholders. . . . [And therefore, determination of the viability of an
in pari delicto defense] would essentially require a mini-trial on the
merits of another litigation, before the Court could address the merits
of this action.”131
In other contexts, such as a legal malpractice actions, for
example, a court necessarily does engage in what amounts to a minitrial or a case-within-a case to resolve an essential claim element, i.e.,
whether an attorney’s negligence was the “but for” cause of a
plaintiff’s injury or loss. However, an important distinction between
the CVVT litigation and a malpractice action exists. The mini-trial in
which Judge Carney refused to engage would not have resolved an
essential element of the Receiver’s claims -- only whether the Receiver
129

The Receiver also asserted that the prior (dismissed) securities class action
lawsuits (which the defense established were based on the same gravamen of facts),
were of no moment. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 10-11. He
urged that because they were brought by shareholders, in their individual capacities,
rather than derivatively on CVTI’s behalf, they were really different claims. Id. The
defense responded that the issue was not whether they were nominated “class” or
“derivative” but whether the factual predicate underlying the claims, however
nominated, was the same. See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 46, at 16-20.
130
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL
6137618, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018).
131
Id. at *8-9.
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could assert those claims. This determination, as Judge Carney noted,
would have been necessary to resolve “before the Court could address
the merits of this action.”132 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge
Carney, stating that even if the auditors had a plausible in pari delicto
defense against derivative claims brought by CVVT shareholders,
defenses, hypothetical or otherwise do not toll otherwise applicable
statutes of limitations.133
The Receiver, seeking a rehearing en banc, asserted that he
should be granted “a panel rehearing of this case to properly consider
the role that in pari delicto played in the Receiver’s argument, as well
as how it showed the shareholders, even with knowledge, had no
ability to bring their derivative claims . . . .”134 The Ninth Circuit
denied the Receiver’s Petition for a rehearing in a unanimous 3-0
decision.135 Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the trial judge resolved
whether the Receiver’s assertion that the Auditors would have been
able to successfully assert an in pari delicto defense to any shareholder
derivative claims. The Receiver’s assertions were deemed so
speculative and attenuated, as to not warrant a mini-trial to determine
whether the Court should address the pleading merits.136 It held the
Receiver’s allegations were insufficient to warrant tolling of the
otherwise applicable statute of limitations.137
The Seiden trial and appeal courts refused to assess the
likelihood that the Receiver might have prevailed on his hypothetical
in pari delicto defense, to try to avoid a limitations dismissal.
However, in other contexts, courts have evaluated hypothetical in pari
delicto defenses with, as commentators have observed, varying and
inconsistent results.138
The issue of whether an accountant can be liable to his own
client, in negligence, or contract for failure to perform his obligations
with the implied obligation of due care frequently arises. Bankruptcy
trustees, receivers or other persons who step into the client’s shoes,
including, for example, the FDIC or SIPC, often aggressively assert
claims. The theory frequently proffered is that, but for the accountant's
132

Id. at *9.
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 F. App’x 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2020).
134
Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 11,
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-561767).
135
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4005 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020).
136
Seiden, 2018 WL 6137618, at *9.
137
Seiden, 796 F. App'x at 383.
138
Swanson, supra note 6, at 44-48.
133
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negligence, the company would not have become insolvent, and the
accountant's negligence, therefore, was the cause of (or contributed to)
the company's downfall. 139 This commonly asserted theory was
propounded aggressively by the Receiver in support of CVTI’s claims
against its auditors. 140 In such cases, where a corporation or a thirdparty who has stepped into the corporation’s shoes sues an auditor, the
auditor will often argue that its alleged negligence or fraud was the
result of the corporation’s (or company officer’s) fraud, thus giving
rise to an in pari delicto defense.141
In Kirschner v. KPMG LLP,142 the New York Court of Appeals
held that the in pari delicto doctrine would bar a shareholder derivative
action, filed under New York law, against an outside auditor sued for
professional malpractice or negligence based on the auditor's failure to
detect a corporation fraud.143 The Receiver did not cite Kirschner
before either the California District Court or the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in support of his assertion that a shareholder derivative action
against the Auditors would have been futile due to the Auditors’ ability
to raise the in pari delicto defense.144 It is not clear whether the
Receiver’s failure to cite Kirschner was an oversight, or whether it was
intentional. Kirschner suggests that acceptance of the in pari delicto
defense under the circumstances of that case was actually contingent
on the absence of adverse domination.
Kirschner involved
certification of questions to the New York Court of Appeals from the
Second Circuit and Delaware Supreme Court. The question from
Delaware was:
Would the doctrine of in pari delicto bar a derivative
claim under New York law where a corporation sues its
outside auditor for professional malpractice or
139

Id. at 44.
See Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 13-15.
141
Swanson, supra note 6, at 44-45.
142
938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010).
143
Id. at 945.
144
As set forth above, CVTI’s shareholders did file a shareholder derivative action
against the corporation for the same activities that were the subject of the Seiden
litigation. The shareholders, however, did not seek relief against the auditors in the
derivative action, which was eventually voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice and
without explanation. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Exs.
J-K to Declaration of Lawrence A. Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No.
SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. Nos.
11-12.
140
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negligence based on the auditor's failure to detect fraud
committed by the corporation; and, the outside auditor
did not knowingly participate in the corporation's fraud,
but instead, failed to satisfy professional standards in its
audits of the corporation's financial statements? 145
The question the Delaware Supreme Court certified was answered in
the affirmative.146
The New York Court of Appeals would have applied the in pari
delicto doctrine, but with a caveat that: “the certified question should
be answered ‘Yes,’ assuming the adverse interest exception does not
apply.”147 The adverse interest exception, as interpreted by Kirschner,
applies to situations in which the agent or adverse actor has “totally
abandoned his principal's interests and [was] acting entirely for his
own or another's purpose.”148 The reason that the Court of Appeals
added this caveat is because it chose to apply general principles of
agency which normally bind a principal to its agent’s actions intended
to benefit a company. The Court of Appeals held that “[t]o allow a
corporation to avoid the consequences of corporate acts simply
because an employee performed them with his personal profit in mind
would enable the corporation to disclaim, at its convenience, virtually
every act its officers undertake.” 149 Therefore, under New York law,
even if a corporate officer’s actions have an ultimate adverse impact
on the corporation, if the officer’s initial intent was to benefit the
corporation, the adverse interest doctrine will not apply.150

145

Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 949 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 945.
147
Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
148
Id. at 952.
149
Id.
150
While many courts have considered auditor liability in this context, approaches to
the issue are varied. Some courts, such as the Kirschner court, have followed Cenco,
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982), relying on tort-liability
objectives. These courts impute the corporate officers' fraud to the corporation if the
fraud led to any short-term benefit and, relying on this imputation, preclude claims
against a corporation's auditor. Other courts have focused primarily on agency law
principle, precluding a collusive auditor—but not a negligent auditor—from raising
an in pari delicto defense. See Shepard, supra note 4, at 317. Because a third party
who does not deal with a principal in good faith has no basis in agency law to invoke
imputation, so the argument goes, it has no basis to benefit from an in pari delicto
defense. Still other courts have used a combination of both these approaches or have
simply held that, as a policy matter, auditors may not invoke imputation. See id.
146
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Had the Receiver relied on Kirschner and had the California
courts followed the principles it enunciated; he would have been
placed in a box from which he could not have escaped. For the
Receiver to establish the availability of an in pari delicto defense, he
would have had to negate the CVTI shareholders’ ability and
motivation to seek derivative relief against the Auditors—in other
words, he would also have had to establish there was no adverse
domination by the officers who committed the fraud. This would have
undermined his argument for tolling the limitation period which was
premised on his allegation that CVTI had been adversely dominated so
that the alleged fraud could not have been discovered until after his
appointment. He would have had to negate his entire rational for
tolling, namely, adverse domination.
Auditors are frequently sued for failing to detect the fraud of
corporate officers. Such suits can be brought as shareholder derivative
actions, or by Bankruptcy Trustees or by court-appointed Receivers
and, as commentators have explained:
The auditor in this scenario has a powerful defense in
its corner: in pari delicto. Under accepted agency
principles, the knowledge of a corporate officer is
imputed to the corporation and the corporation is
deemed to have that knowledge. Likewise, imputation
makes the corporation legally responsible for an
officer's fraud. The officer's fraud is, in law, the
corporation's fraud which makes the corporation a
wrongdoer in front of the court. The defense of in pari
delicto prevents a wrongdoer from seeking redress
against another alleged wrongdoer. Because the
corporation's creditors or shareholders bring their claim
on behalf of the corporation, they “step into the shoes”
of the corporation and any defense that can be asserted
against the corporation may be asserted against them.
In the corporate fraud context, then, these doctrines
work together to immunize auditors from liability. 151
In the Seiden litigation, resolution of the statute of limitations
issue on the pleadings was possible because multiple litigations,
including class and derivative litigations, had been filed, including
class claims against the Auditors, and they were resolved within the
151

Shepard, supra note 4, at 277-78.
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statute of limitations and the Receiver’s claims arose from the same
gravamen of operative fact. This obviated the need to determine
whether the auditors could have raised an in pari delicto defense if a
derivative claim had been filed against them because they had the
opportunity to seek redress for the same violations and pursued
redress. The in pari delicto defense would not have been available to
the Auditors against the Receiver, if he had been allowed to proceed
with his claims, because the Ninth Circuit has held the in pari delicto
defense is not available as a defense to claims brought by a receiver
appointed to take over the affairs of an adversely dominated
corporation.152
However, the question the Receiver raised was whether the in
pari delicto defense would have been available to the Auditors in a
shareholder derivative action and, if so, would that possibility have
negated shareholder motivation to bring such an action, allowing the
Receiver to bring an action, otherwise untimely, for lack of the
shareholders’ “incentive” to sue. 153 Had the rule in Kirschner been
followed, the in pari delicto defense would have been available to the
Auditors—but only if adverse domination was not present. The
possibility of availability of an in pari delicto defense in a
(hypothetical) shareholders derivative suit would have required a factsensitive determination. 154

152

See generally Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding that defenses based on unclean hands or inequitable conduct do
not generally apply against a party's receiver because the receiver does not step into
the party’s shoes but “is thrust into those shoes”).
153
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 17, 29-33.
154
See Swanson, supra note 6, at 46.
It is clear that there is substantial confusion in this area of the law and that
judges continue to struggle with in pari delicto and other “Cenco”-type
defenses. When such a defense is rejected, and the suit is allowed, the
theory of damages is generally one of “deepening insolvency,” i.e., that
had the fraud been uncovered earlier, the company at a minimum would
have been much less deeply insolvent, owing less to its creditors. Even
this theory has generated controversy and confusion. For example, the
Third Circuit recently held there was a cause of action for "deepening
insolvency" in favor of a bankruptcy trustee when the underlying
challenged conduct was fraudulent (as opposed to merely negligent). But
the Delaware Chancery Court rejected that view, concluding, instead, that
“deepening insolvency” was not an independent cause of action, but
merely a theory of damages when there was another available liability
theory.

Id. (citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION

In Seiden, the Receiver relied heavily on Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers,155 for the proposition that
defenses based on unclean hands or inequitable conduct do not
generally apply against a receiver. 156 Court appointed receivers have
often been treated differently from trustees in bankruptcy in this
regard. United States courts have generally interpreted Bankruptcy
Code section 541 as limiting a trustee's rights to those of the
corporation as they existed at the time the bankruptcy proceeding
commenced. Accordingly, a bankruptcy trustee -- unlike a court
appointed receiver -- may be subject to any in pari delicto defense that
could have been asserted against the bankrupt corporation. 157
O’Melveny has been cited with approval by courts in several
circuits, including the Second Circuit. 158 The Second Circuit itself has
approved of the principles articulated in O’Melveny allowing a
receiver to pursue fraudulent conveyance claims on behalf of a
155

61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995).
See Shepard, supra note 4, at 316-17. Courts often rely on policy and fairness
arguments to conclude that auditors should not be immune from liability.
157
Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1257.
156

In the case of a trustee in bankruptcy, U.S. courts have generally
interpreted section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code to limit a trustee's rights
to those of the corporation as they existed at the time of the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. Accordingly, if the
bankrupt corporation had participated in the wrongdoing, it would on the
date of commencement of the bankruptcy have been disabled from
pursuing claims against confederate wrongdoers on in pari delicto
grounds. The trustee, stepping into those shoes, suffers that same
disability. Court-appointed receivers, however, are a different matter.
Receivers are not limited by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, and in
pursuing claims of the corporation against other wrongdoers, receivers are
generally not hampered by the in pari delicto defenses raised by those third
parties.

Id.
158

See Adelphia Comms. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 365 B.R. 24, 56 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“With the guilty insiders having been displaced before the filing
date, there is not even an arguable statutory or caselaw basis upon which to ignore
the fairness considerations articulated in . . . O'Melveny.”); see also Colonial
BancGroup, Inc. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 2:11-cv-746-BJR, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 175086, at *18 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2017); Evans v. Armenta, No. 14329-GFVT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194540, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 26, 2016); Javitch
v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 408 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (N.D. Ohio
2006); In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442 (DHS), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
4798, at *110-11 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2013).
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corporation which had been adversely dominated. 159 Unless statutory
requirements, such as Bankruptcy Code section 541 compel otherwise,
principles of fairness should be the main determinant of whether an in
pari delicto defense is applicable, as well as whether the limitation
period should be tolled because of adverse domination. 160 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed Judge Carney’s decision 161 and, with respect to the in
pari delicto issue held, without citing case authority, that: “even if [the
auditors] had a plausible in pari delicto defense against derivative
claims brought by CVVT shareholders, defenses—hypothetical or
otherwise—do not toll otherwise applicable statutes of limitations.” 162
The dissent in Kirschner explained that innocent shareholders bringing
derivative actions should be afforded even greater protection and that
“the weight of the equities favors allowing suits such as these to go
forward to deter active wrongdoing or negligence by auditors and
similar professionals.”163 The dissent seems to be articulating similar
159

Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing and quoting Scholes
v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995)) (“The appointment of the receiver
removed the wrongdoer from the scene. The corporations were no more Douglas's
evil zombies. Freed from his spell they became entitled to the return of the moneys .
. . that Douglas had made the corporations divert to unauthorized purposes.”).
160
O’Melveny articulated an exception to the general rule that “[a] receiver occupies
no better position than that which was occupied by the person or party for whom he
acts . . . and any defense good against the original party is good against the receiver.”
61 F.3d at 19 (quoting Allen v. Ramsay, 4 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1960)). That exception applied to the inapplicability of an in pari delicto defense. It
did not allow a receiver to revive an already expired statute of limitations. In Seiden,
the California District Court and the Ninth Circuit applied fairness principles,
consistent with California case law, holding the limitation period should not be
equitably tolled, on the grounds of adverse domination, because CVTI shareholders
learned of the alleged wrongdoing of the corporate directors and had the opportunity
and motivation to seek redress. See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 1800588-CJC (KESx), at 12, 2018 WL 6137618, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF
No. 32; Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 F. App'x 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2020).
161
In the absence of any directly applicable California law on the issue of whether
an in pari delicto defense would have been applicable to a shareholder derivative
action brought by CVTI’s shareholders, District Judge Carney applied principles of
fairness and common sense to conclude that it was unlikely that the Auditors could
successfully invoke an in pari delicto defense against a derivative action filed in
behalf of CVTI by innocent shareholders who, themselves, were allegedly victims of
the fraud perpetrated by the wrongdoing directors. Transcript of Proceedings, supra
note 55, at 17-18.
162
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 F. App'x 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2020).
163
Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 964 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J.,
dissenting).
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fairness concerns to those raised by Judge Carney who, plainly, could
not conceive of the fairness of punishing innocent shareholders for the
acts of corporation-adverse directors.164 In Seiden, it was clear from
the pleading and documentary evidence that the CVTI shareholders
had prior knowledge of the misconduct underlying the Receiver’s
claims. As a result, no limitation period tolling was appropriate as of
the time knowledge of the subject wrongdoing was acquired. In
similar cases, dismissal on the pleading should be appropriate—
particularly where, as in Seiden, the applicable limitations period had
expired prior to a receiver’s filing.
Both Judge Carney and the Ninth Circuit appear to have relied
on their sense of fairness in dismissing the Receiver’s pleading,
without leave to replead, notwithstanding Judge Carney’s recognition
that further fact-finding might have allowed the Court to definitively
determine whether CVVT’s shareholders would have been subject to
an in pari delicto defense. A three-judge panel, nevertheless,
unanimously denied the Receiver’s subsequent application for a
rehearing and then, a rehearing en banc to reconsider his in pari delicto
arguments.165
Denial of the Receiver’s in pari delicto arguments may reflect
the dearth of on point case decisions. 166 It was certainly possible to
conduct a case-within-a-case analysis and, in cases involving, for
example, professional malpractice, such analysis may be necessary to
determine the damages element of a claim. Whether to conduct a casewithin-a-case analysis involves policy considerations. If plaintiff can
show the shareholders would have been dissuaded from seeking
redress through a derivative action because claims in that action would
be subject to an in pari delicto defense, liberal pleading rules militate
against dismissal.167 Yet, allowing an adverse domination predicated
164

Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 55, at 17-18.
Seiden v. Frazer Frost LLC, No. 18-56176, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4005 (9th Cir.
Feb. 10, 2020).
166
Seiden v. Frazer Frost LLC, No. 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 6137618, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), aff’d, 796 F. App’x 381 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2020), reh’g
en banc denied, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4005 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020).
167
Significantly, the Receiver did not plead that CVTI shareholders had no motive
to seek redress due to in pari delicto. However, after dismissal of his pleading he
was not afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint to include this allegation.
See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 F. App'x 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[t]he district
court correctly determined that Seiden’s failure to plead adverse domination could
not be cured by any amendment.”).
165

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/8

40

Steckman and Rader: Adverse Domination

2021

ADVERSE DOMINATION

737

pleading to go forward based on the thin reed of a hypothetical in pari
delicto defense being asserted in a hypothetical action seems prima
facia to run counter to judicial economy principles and the unfairness
of defendant having to defend stale claims. 168
In some contexts, a statute of repose may be applicable, rather
than a statute of limitations and the latter may immunize a defendant
from liability even where the potential claim against him could not
have been discovered until after a limitation period elapsed. 169 Seiden
involved application of a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose
but, ultimately, the equities of subjecting the auditor defendants to
having to defend the Receiver’s stale claims, along with principles of
judicial economy, may have seemed too much—and the justification
in their minds might have been analogous to a repose-justified
outcome. Given the same gravamen of alleged facts had been
previously pleaded and adjudicated, in several cases, and those cases,
having been dismissed with prejudice, it may have seemed
unreasonable to give the Receiver an opportunity to try to re-plead
claims based on those same facts, where his argument was based on
how a hypothetical in pari delicto argument would have fared in a
hypothetical derivative.

168

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987)
(“In compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins
may be forgotten.”).
169
See P. Stolz Family P'ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2004).
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